We study algorithms for online linear optimization in Hilbert spaces, focusing on the case where the player is unconstrained. We develop a novel characterization of a large class of minimax algorithms, recovering, and even improving, several previous results as immediate corollaries. Moreover, using our tools, we develop an algorithm that provides a regret bound of
Introduction
The online learning framework provides a scalable and flexible approach for modeling a wide range of prediction problems, including classification, regression, ranking, and portfolio management. Online algorithms work in rounds, where at each round a new instance is given and the algorithm makes a prediction. Then the environment reveals the label of the instance, and the learning algorithm updates its internal hypothesis. The aim of the learner is to minimize the cumulative loss it suffers due to its prediction error.
Research in this area has mainly focused on designing new prediction strategies and proving theoretical guarantees for them. However, recently, minimax analysis has been proposed as a general tool to design optimal prediction strategies [Rakhlin et al., 2012 , 2013 , McMahan and Abernethy, 2013 . The problem is cast as a sequential multi-stage zero-sum game between the player (the learner) and an adversary (the environment), providing the optimal strategies for both. In some cases the value of the game can be calculated exactly in an efficient way [Abernethy et al., 2008a] , in others upper bounds on the value of the game (often based on the sequential Rademacher complexity) are used to construct efficient algorithms with theoretical guarantees [Rakhlin et al., 2012] .
While most of the work in this area has focused on the setting where the player is constrained to a bounded convex set [Abernethy et al., 2008a] (with the notable exception of McMahan and Abernethy [2013] ), in this work we are interested in the general setting of unconstrained online learning with linear losses in Hilbert spaces. In Section 4, extending the work of McMahan and Abernethy [2013] , we provide novel and general sufficient conditions to be able to compute the exact minimax strategy for both the player and the adversary, as well as the value of the game. In particular, we show that under these conditions the optimal play of the adversary is always orthogonal or always parallel to the sum of his previous plays, while the optimal play of the player is always parallel. On the other hand, for some cases where the exact minimax strategy is hard to characterize, we introduce a new relaxation procedure based on a Normal approximation. In the particular application of interest, we show the relaxation is strong enough to yield an optimal regret bound, up to constant factors.
In Section 5, we use our new tools to recover and extend previous results on minimax strategies for linear online learning, including results for bounded domains. In fact, we show how to obtain a family of minimax strategies that smoothly interpolates between the minimax algorithm for a bounded feasible set and a minimax optimal algorithm in fact equivalent to unconstrained gradient descent. We emphasize that all the algorithms from this family are exactly minimax optimal, 1 in a sense we will make precise in the next section. Moreover, if you are allowed to play outside of the comparator set, we show that some members of this family have a non-vacuous regret bound for the unconstrained setting, while remaining optimal for the constrained one.
When studying unconstrained problems, a natural question is how small we can make the dependence of the regret bound on U , the L 2 norm of an arbitrary comparator point, while still maintaining a √ T dependency on the time horizon. The best algorithm from the above family achieves Streeter and McMahan [2012] and Orabona [2013] show it is possible to reduce the dependence on U to O(U log U T ). In order to improve on this, in Section 6 we apply our techniques to analyze a strategy, based on a Normal potential function, that gives a regret bound
where U is the L 2 norm of a comparator, and both T and U are unknown. This bound is optimal up to √ log log T terms. Moreover, when T is known, we propose an algorithm based on a similar potential function that is optimal up to constant terms. This solves the open problem posed in those papers, matching the lower bound for this problem. Table 1 summarizes the regret bounds we prove, along with those for related algorithms.
Our analysis tools for both known-T and unknown horizon algorithms rest heavily on the relationship between the reward (negative loss) achieved by the algorithm, potential functions that provide a benchmark for the amount of reward the algorithm should have, the regret of the algorithm with respect to a post-hoc comparator u, and the conditional value of the game. These are familiar concepts from the literature, but we summarize these relationships and provide some modest generalizations in Section 3.
Notation and Problem Formulation
Let H be a Hilbert space with inner product ·, · . The associated norm is denoted by · , i.e. x = x, x . Given a closed and convex function f with domain S ⊆ H, we will denote its Fenchel conjugate by f * : H → R where f * (u) = sup v∈S v, u − f (v) . We consider a version of online linear optimization, a standard game for studying repeated decision making. On each of a sequence of rounds, a player chooses an action w t ∈ H, an adversary chooses a linear cost function g t ∈ G ⊆ H, and the player suffers loss w t , g t . For any sequence of plays Abernethy et al. [2008a] (B) OGD, fixed η 1 2
Regret bounds for known-T algorithms
Cor. 9, which also covers (A) and (B)
Regret bounds for adaptive algorithms for unknown T
Table 1: Summary of regret bounds for unconstrained linear optimization. Here U = u is the norm of a comparator, with U unknown to the algorithm. We let W = {w : w ≤ 1}; the adversary plays gradients with g t ≤ 1. (A) is minimax optimal for regret against points in W, and always plays points from W. The other algorithms are unconstrained. Even though (A) is minimax optimal for regret, other algorithms (e.g. (B)) offer strictly better bounds for arbitrary U . (C) corresponds to a family of minimax optimal algorithms where 1 p + 1 q = 1; p = 2 yields (B) and as p → 1 the algorithm becomes (A); Corollary 9 covers (A) exactly. Only (D) has a dependence on d, the dimension of H. The O * in (I) hides an additional log 2 (T + 1) term inside the log.
w 1 , . . . w T and g 1 , . . . , g T , we define the regret against a comparator u in the standard way:
This setting is general enough to cover the cases of online learning in, for example, R d , in the vector space of matrices, and in a RKHS. We also define the reward of the algorithm, which is the earnings (or negative losses) of the player throughout the game:
We write θ t ≡ −g 1:t , where we use the compressed summation notation g 1:t ≡ T s=1 g s .
The
Minimax View It will be useful to consider a full game-theoretic characterization of the above interaction when the number of rounds T is known to both players. This approach that has received significant recent interest [Abernethy et al., 2008a , 2007 , Abernethy and Warmuth, 2010 , Abernethy et al., 2008b , Streeter and McMahan, 2012 .
In the constrained setting, where the comparator vector u ∈ W, we have that the value of the game, that is the regret when both the player and the adversary play optimally, is
where
Following McMahan and Abernethy [2013] , we generalize the game in terms of a generic convex benchmark function B : H → R, instead of using the definition (1). This allows us to analyze the constrained and unconstrained setting in a unified way. Hence, the value of the game is the difference between the benchmark reward B(θ T ) and the actual reward achieved by the player (under optimal play by both parties). Intuitively, viewing the units of loss/reward as dollars, V is the amount of starting capital we need (equivalently, the amount we need to borrow) to ensure we end the game with B(θ T ) dollars. The motivation for defining the game in terms of an arbitrary B is made clear in the next section: It will allow us to derive Regret bounds in terms of the Fenchel conjugate of B.
We define inductively the conditional value of the game after g 1 , . . . , g t have been played by
Thus, we can view the notation V for the value of the game as shorthand for V 0 (0). Under minimax play by both players, unrolling the previous equality, we have
We also have that, given the conditional value of the game, a minimax-optimal strategy is
McMahan and Abernethy [2013, Cor. 2] showed that in the unconstrained case, V t is a smoothed version of B, where the smoothing comes from an expectation over future plays of the adversary. In this work, we show that in some cases (Theorem 4) we can find a closed form for V t in terms of B, and in fact the solution to (3) will simply be the gradient of V t , or equivalently, an FTRL algorithm with regularizer V * t . On the other hand, to derive our main results, we face a case (Theorem 6) where V t is generally not expressible in closed form, and the resulting algorithm does not look like FTRL. We solve the first problem by using a Normal approximation to the adversary's future moves, and we solve the second by showing (3) can still be solved in closed form with respect to this approximation to V t .
Potential Functions and the Duality of Reward and Regret
In the present section we will review some existing results in online learning theory as well as provide a number of mild generalizations for our purposes. Potential functions play a major role in the design and analysis of online learning algorithms [Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006] . We will use q : H → R to describe the potential, and the key assumptions are that q should depend solely on the cumulative gradients g 1:T and that q is convex in this argument.
2 Since our aim is adaptive algorithms, we often look at a sequence of changing potential functions q 1 , . . . , q T , each of which takes as argument −g 1:t and is convex. These functions have appeared with different interpretations in many papers, with different emphasis. They can be viewed as 1) the conjugate of an (implicit) time-varying regularizer in a Mirror Descent or Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) algorithm [Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006 , Shalev-Shwartz, 2007 , Rakhlin, 2009 , 2) as proxy for the conditional value of the game in a minimax setting [Rakhlin et al., 2012] , or 3) a potential giving a bound on the amount of reward we want the algorithm to have obtained at the end of round t [Streeter and McMahan, 2012, McMahan and Abernethy, 2013] .
These views are of course closely connected, but can lead to somewhat different analysis techniques. Following the last view, suppose we interpret q t (θ t ) as the desired reward at the end of round t, given the adversary has played θ t = −g 1:t so far. Then, if we can bound our actual final reward in terms of q T (θ T ), we also immediately get a regret bound stated in terms of the Fenchel conjugate q * T . Generalizing Streeter and McMahan [2012, Thm. 1], we have the following result (all omitted proofs can be found in the Appendix).
Theorem 1. Let Ψ : H → R be a convex function. An algorithm for the player guarantees
for a constantǫ ∈ R if and only if it guarantees
First we consider the minimax setting, where we define the game in terms of a convex benchmark B. Then, (2) gives us an immediate lower bound on the reward of the minimax strategy for the player (against any adversary), and so applying Theorem 1 with Ψ = B gives
The fundamental point, of which we will make much use, is this: even if one only cares about the traditional definition of regret, the study of the minimax game defined in terms of a general comparator benchmark B may be interesting, as the minimax algorithm for the player may then give novel bounds on regret. Note when B is defined as in (1), the theorem implies ∀u ∈ W, Regret(u) ≤ V . More generally, even for non-minimax algorithms, Theorem 1 states that understanding the reward (equivalently, loss) of an algorithm as a function of the sum of gradients chosen by the adversary is both necessary and sufficient for understanding the regret of the algorithm. Now we consider the potential function view. The following general bound for any sequence of plays w t against gradients g t , for an arbitrary sequence of potential functions q t , has been used numerous times (see Orabona [2013, Lemma 1] and references therein). The claim is that
where we take θ 0 = 0, and assume q 0 ( 0) = 0. In fact, this statement is essentially equivalent to the argument of (4) and (5). For intuition, we can view q t (θ t ) as the amount of money we wish to have available at the end of round t. Suppose at the end of each round t, we borrow an additional sum ǫ t as needed to ensure we actually have q t (θ t ) on hand. Then, based on this invariant, the amount of reward we actually have after playing on round t is q t−1 (θ t−1 ) + w t , −g t , the money we had at the beginning of the round, plus the reward we get for playing w t . Thus, the additional amount we need to borrow at the end of round t in order to maintain the invariant is exactly
recalling θ t = θ t−1 − g t . Thus, if we can find boundsǫ t such that for all t, θ t−1 , and g ∈ G,
we can re-state (7) as exactly (5) with Ψ = q T andǫ =ǫ 1:T . Further, solving (8) for the per-round reward w t , −g t , summing from t = 1 to T and canceling telescoping terms gives exactly (4). Not surprisingly, both Theorem 1 and (7) can be proved in terms of the Fenchel-Young inequality. When T is known, and the q t are chosen carefully, it is possible to obtainǫ t = 0. On the other hand, when T is unknown to the players, typically we will need boundsǫ t > 0. For example, in both Streeter and McMahan [2012, Thm. 6] and Orabona [2013] , the key is showing the sum of theseǫ t terms is always bounded by a constant. For completeness, we also state standard results where we interpret q * t as a regularizer.
The conjugate regularizer and Bregman divergences The updates of many algorithms are based on a time-varying version of the FTRL strategy,
where we view q * t as a time-varying regularizer (see and references therein). Regret bounds can be easily obtained using (7) when the regularizers q * t (w) are increasing with t, and they are strongly convex w.r.t. a norm · * , using the fact that the potential functions q t will be strongly smooth. Then strong smoothness and particular choice of w t implies
which leads to the bound
where the last inequality follows from the fact that if f (x) ≤ g(x), then f * (y) ≥ g * (y) (immediate from the definition of the conjugate).
When the regularizer q * is fixed, that is, q t = q for all t for some convex function q, we get the approach pioneered by Grove et al. [2001] and Kivinen and Warmuth [2001] :
where D q is the Bregman Divergence with respect to q, and we predict with w t = ∇q(θ t−1 ).
Admissible relaxations and potentials
We extend the notion of relaxations of the conditional value of the game of Rakhlin et al. [2012] to the present setting. We say v t with corresponding strategy w t is a relaxation of
for constantsǫ t ≥ 0. This definition matches Eq. (4) of Rakhlin et al. [2012] if we force allǫ t = 0, but if we allow some slackǫ t , (13) corresponds exactly to (8) and (9). Note that (13) is invariant to adding a constant to all v t . In particular, given an admissible v t , we can define q t (θ) = v t (θ) − v 0 ( 0) so q t ( 0) = 0 and q satisfies (9) with the sameǫ t values for which v t satisfies (13). Or we could define q 0 ( 0) = 0 and q t (θ) = v t (θ) for t ≥ 1, and takeǫ 1 ←ǫ 1 + v 0 ( 0) (or any other way of distributing the v 0 ( 0) into theǫ). Generally, when T is known we will find working with admissible relaxations v t to be most useful, while for unknown horizons T , potential functions with q 0 ( 0) = 0 will be more natural.
For our admissible relaxations, we have a result that closely mirrors 
Proof. For the first statement, re-arranging and summing (13) shows Reward t ≥ v t (θ t ) −ǫ 1:t − v 0 (0) and so final Reward ≥ B(θ) − v 0 (0) −ǫ 1:T ; the second result then follows from Theorem 1.
The regret bound corresponds to (6); in particular, if we take v t to be the conditional value of the game, then (12) and (13) hold with equality with allǫ t = 0. Note if we define B as in (1), the regret guarantee becomes ∀u ∈ W, Regret(u) ≤ v 0 (0) +ǫ 1:T , analogous to [Rakhlin et al., 2012, Prop. 1] whenǫ 1:T = 0.
Deriving algorithms Consider an admissible relaxation v t . Given the form of the regret bounds we have proved, a natural strategy is to choose w t+1 so as to minimizeǫ t+1 , that is,
following Rakhlin et al. [2012, Eq. (5) ], Rakhlin et al. [2013] , and Streeter and McMahan [2012, Eq. (8)] . We see that v t+1 is standing in for the conditional value of the game in (3). Since additive constants do not impact the argmin, we could also replace v t with a potential q t , say q t (θ) = v t (θ) − v 0 (0).
Minimax Analysis Approaches for Known-Horizon Games
In general, the problem of calculating the conditional value of a game V t (θ) is hard. And even for a known potential, deriving an optimal solution via (14) is also in general a hard problem. When the player is unconstrained, we can simplify the computation of V t and the derivation of optimal strategies. For example, following ideas from McMahan and Abernethy [2013] ,
where ∆(G) is the set of probability distributions on G. McMahan and Abernethy [2013] shows that in some cases is possible to easily calculate this maximum, in particular when G = [−G, G] d and q t decomposes on a per-coordinate spaces (that is, when the problem is essentially d independent, one-dimensional problems).
In this section we will state two quite general cases where we can obtain the exact value of the game, even though the problem does not decompose on a per coordinate basis. Note that in both cases the optimal strategy for w t+1 will be in the direction of θ t .
We study the game when the horizon T is known, with a benchmark function of the form B(θ) = f ( θ ) for an increasing convex function f : [0, +∞] → R (which ensures B is convex). Note this form for B is particularly natural given our desire to prove results that hold for general Hilbert spaces. We will then be able to derive regret bounds using Theorem 1, and the following technical lemma:
Recall that f is even if f (x) = f (−x). Our key tool will be a careful study of the one-round version of this game. For this section, we let h : R → R be an even convex function that is increasing on [0, ∞], G = {g : g ≤ G}, and d the dimension of H. We consider the one-round game
where θ ∈ H is a fixed parameter. For results regarding this game, we let H(w, g) = w, g + h( θ − g ), w * = arg min w max g∈G H(w, g), and g * = arg max g∈G H(w * , g). Also, letθ = θ θ if θ = 0, and 0 otherwise.
The case of the orthogonal adversary
Let B(θ) = f ( θ ) for an increasing convex function f : [0, ∞] → R, and define
Note that f t ( θ ) can be viewed as a smoothed version of B(θ), since θ 2 + C is a smoothed version of θ for a constant C > 0. Moreover, f 0 ( θ ) = B(θ).
Our first key result is the following:
Theorem 4. Let the adversary play from G = {g : g ≤ G} and assume all the f t satisfy
Then the value of the game is f (G √ T ), the conditional value is V t (θ) = f t ( θ ) = f t+1 ( θ 2 + G 2 ), and the optimal strategy can be found using (14) on V t .
Further, a sufficient condition for (16) is that d > 1, f is twice differentiable, and f ′′ (x) ≤ f ′ (x)/x, for all x > 0. In this case we also have that the minimax optimal strategy is
In this case, the minimax optimal strategy (20) is equivalent to the FTRL strategy in (10) with the time varying regularizer V * t (w). The key lemma needed for the proof is the following:
Lemma 5. Consider the game of (15). Then, if d > 1, h is twice differentiable, and h
for x > 0, we have:
Any g * such that θ, g * = 0 and g * = G is a minimax play for the adversary.
We defer the proofs to the Appendix (of the proofs in the appendix, the proof of Lemmas 5 and 8 are perhaps the most important and instructive). Since the best response of the adversary is always to play a g * orthogonal to θ, we call this the case of the orthogonal adversary.
The case of the parallel adversary, and Normal approximations
We analyze a second case where (15) has closed-form solution, and hence derive a class of games where we can cleanly state the value of the game and the minimax optimal strategy. The results of McMahan and Abernethy [2013] can be viewed as a special case of the results in this section. First, we introduce some notation. We write τ ≡ T − t when T and t are clear from context. We write r ∼ {−1, 1} to indicate r is a Rademacher random variable, and r τ ∼ {−1, 1} τ to indicate r τ is the sum of τ IID Rademacher random variables. Let σ = π/2. We write φ for a random variable with distribution N (0, σ 2 ), and similarly define φ τ ∼ N (0, (T − t)σ 2 ). Then, define
and note B(θ) = f T ( θ ) =f T ( θ ) since φ 0 and r 0 are always zero. These functions are exactly smoothed version of the function f used to define B. With these definitions, we can now state: 
is exactly the conditional value of the game, and (14) gives the minimax optimal strategy:
Similarly, suppose thef t satisfy the equality (19) (withf t replacing f t ). Then q t (θ) =f t ( θ ) is an admissible relaxation of V t , satisfying (13) withǫ t = 0, using w t+1 based on (14). Further, a sufficient condition for (19) is that d = 1, or d > 1, the f t (orf t , respectively) are twice differentiable, and satisfy and f
Contrary to the case of the orthogonal adversary, the strategy in (20) cannot easily be interpreted as an FTRL algorithm. The proof is based on two lemmas. The first provides the key tool in supporting the Normal relaxation: Lemma 7. Let f : R → R be a convex function and σ 2 = π/2. Then,
Proof. First observe that E[(φ − 1)1{φ > 0}] = 0 and E[(φ + 1)1{φ < 0}] = 0 by our choice of σ. We will use two lower bounds on the function f , which follow from convexity:
Writing out the value of E[f (φ)] explicitly we have
The latter two terms vanish, giving the stated inequality.
The second lemma is used to prove the sufficient condition by solving the one-round game; again, the proof is deferred to the Appendix. Note that functions of the form h(x) = g(x 2 ), with g convex always satisfies the conditions of the following Lemma.
Lemma 8. Consider the game of (15). Then, if d = 1, or if d > 1, h is twice differentiable, and
Any g * that satisfies | θ, g * | = G θ and g * =G is a minimax play for the adversary.
The adversary can always play g * = G θ θ when θ = 0, and so we describe this as the case of the parallel adversary. In fact, inductively this means that all the adversary's plays g t can be on the same line, providing intuition for the fact that this lemma also applies in the 1-dimensional case.
Theorem 6 provides a recipe to produce suitable relaxations q t which may, in certain cases, exhibit nice closed form solutions. The interpretation here is that a "Gaussian adversary" is stronger than one playing from the set [−1, 1] which leads to IID Rademacher behavior, and this allows us to generate such potential functions via Gaussian smoothing. In this view, note that our choice of σ 2 gives E φ [|φ|] = 1.
A Power Family of Minimax Algorithms
We analyze a family of algorithms based on potentials B(θ) = f ( θ ) where f (x) = W p |x| p for parameters W > 0 and p ∈ [1, 2], when the dimension is at least two. This is reminiscent of p-norm algorithms [Gentile, 2003] , but the connection is superficial-the norm we use to measure θ is always the norm of our Hilbert space. Our main result is:
Corollary 9. Let d > 1 and W > 0, and let f and B be defined as above. Define
is the conditional value of the game, and the optimal strategy is as in Theorem 4. If p ∈ (1, 2], letting q ≥ 2 such that 1/p + 1/q = 1, we have a bound
where the second inequality comes by taking
Hence, we can apply Theorem 4, proving the claim on the f t . The regret bounds can then be derived from Corollary 2, which gives
The fact that p = 2 is an optimal choice in the first bound follows from the fact that d dp
The p = 1 case in fact exactly recaptures the result of Abernethy et al. [2008a] for linear functions, extending it also to spaces of dimension equal to two. The optimal update is w t+1 = ▽f t ( θ t ) = W θ t / θ t 2 + G 2 (T − t). In addition to providing a regret bound for the comparator set W = {u : u ≤ W }, the algorithm will in fact only play points from this set.
For p = q = 2, writing W = η, we have
for any u. In this case we see W = η is behaving not like the radius of a comparator set, but rather as a learning rate. In fact, we have w t+1 = ∇V t (θ t ) = ηθ t = −ηg 1:t , and so we see this minimax-optimal algorithm is in fact constant-step-size gradient descent. d . Comparing the p = 1 and p > 1 algorithms reveals an interesting fact. For simplicity, take G = 1. Then, the p = 1 algorithm with W = 1 is exactly the minimax optimal algorithm for minimizing regret against comparators in the L 2 ball (for d > 1): the value of this game is √ T and we can do no better (even by playing outside of the comparator set). However, picking p > 1 gives us algorithms that will play outside of the comparator set. While they cannot do better than √ T , taking G = 1 and u = 1 shows that all algorithms in this family in fact achieve Regret(u) ≤ √ T when u ≤ 1, matching the exact minimax optimal value. Further, the algorithms with p > 1 provide much stronger guarantees, since they also give non-vacuous guarantees for u > 1, and tighter bounds when u < 1. This suggests that the p = 2 algorithm will be the most useful algorithm in practice, something that indeed has been observed empirically (given the prevalence of gradient descent in real applications). This result also clearly demonstrates the value of studying minimax-optimal algorithms for different choices of the benchmark B, as this can produce algorithms that are no worse and in some cases significantly better than minimax algorithms defined in terms of regret minimization directly (i.e., via (1)).
The key difference in these algorithms is not how they play against a minimax optimal adversary for the regret game, but how they play against non-worst-case adversaries. In fact, a simple induction based on Lemma 5 shows that any minimax-optimal adversary will play so that
T . Against such an adversary, the p = 1 algorithm is identical to the p = 2 algorithm with learning
. In fact, using the choice of W from Corollary 9, all of these algorithms play identically against a minimax adversary for the regret game.
Tight Bounds for Unconstrained Learning
In this section we analyze algorithms based on benchmarks and potentials of the form exp( θ 2 /t), and show they lead to a minimal dependence on u in the corresponding regret bounds for a given upper bound on regret against the origin (equal to the loss of the algorithm).
First, we derive a lower bound for the known T game. Using Lemma 14 in the Appendix, we can show that the B(θ) = exp( θ 2 /T ) benchmark approximately corresponds to a regularizer of the form u T log( √ T u + 1); there is actually some technical challenge here, as the conjugate B * cannot be computed in closed form-the given regularizer is an upper bound. This kind of regularizer is particularly interesting because it is related to parameter-free sub-gradient descent algorithms [Orabona, 2013] ; a similar potential function was used for a parameter-free algorithm by [Chaudhuri et al., 2009] . The lower bound for this game was proven in Streeter and McMahan [2012] for 1-dimensional spaces, and Orabona [2013] extended it to Hilbert spaces and improved the leading constant. We report it here for completeness.
Theorem 10. Fix a non-trivial Hilbert space H and a specific online learning algorithm. If the algorithm guarantees a zero regret against the competitor with zero norm, then there exists a sequence of T cost vectors in H, such that the regret against any other competitor is Ω(T ).
On the other hand, if the algorithm guarantees a regret at most of ǫ > 0 against the competitor with zero norm, then, for any 0 < η < 1, there exists a T 0 and a sequence of T ≥ T 0 unitary norm vectors g t ∈ H, and a vector u ∈ H such that
Deriving a known-T algorithm with minimax rates via the Normal approximation
Consider the game with fixed known T , an adversary that plays from G = {g ∈ H | g ≤ G}, and
for constants a > 1 and ǫ > 0. We will show that we are in the case of the parallel adversary, Section 4.2. Both computing the f t based on Rademacher expectations and evaluating the sufficient condition for those f t appear quite difficult, so we turn to the Normal approximation. We then havê
where we have computed the expectation in a closed form for the second equality. One can quickly verify that it satisfies the hypothesis of Theorem 6 for a > G 2 π/2, hence q t (θ) =f t ( θ ) will be an admissible relaxation. Thus, by Corollary 2, we immediately have
, and so by Lemma 14 in the Appendix, we can state the following Theorem, that matches the lower bound up to a constant multiplicative factor.
Theorem 11. Let a > G 2 π/2, and G = {g : g ≤ G}. Denote byθ = θ θ if θ = 0, and 0 otherwise. Fix the number of rounds T of the game, and consider the strategy
Then, for any sequence of linear costs {g t } T t=1 , and any u ∈ H, we have
AdaptiveNormal: an adaptive algorithm for unknown T
Our techniques suggest the following recipe for developing adaptive algorithms: analyze the known T case, define a potential q t (θ) ≈ V T (θ), and then analyze the incrementally-optimal algorithm for this potential (14) via Theorem 1. We follow this recipe in the current section. Again consider the game where an adversary that plays from G = {g ∈ H | g ≤ G}. Define the function f t as
where a > 3πG 2 4 , and the β t is a decreasing sequence that will be specified in the following. From this, we define the potential q t (θ) = f t ( θ 2 ). Suppose we play the incrementally-optimal algorithm of (14). Using Lemma 8 we can write the minimax value for the one-round game,
Using Lemma 17 in the Appendix and our hypothesis on a, we have that the RHS of this inequality is maximized for θ t = 0. Hence, using the inequality
Thus, choosing β t = ǫ/ log 2 (t + 1), for example, is sufficient to prove that ǫ 1:T is bounded by ǫ πG 2 a [Baxley, 1992] . Hence, again using Corollary 2 and Lemma 14 in the Appendix, we can state the following Theorem. 
A Proofs

A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Suppose the algorithm provides the reward guarantee (4). First, note that for any comparator u, by definition we have
Then, applying the definitions of Reward, Regret, and the Fenchel conjugate, we have
For the other direction, assuming (5), we have for any comparator u, Alternatively, one can prove this from the Fenchel-Young inequality.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. We have B * (u) = sup θ u, θ − f ( θ ). If u = 0, the stated equality is correct, in fact
Hence we can assume u = 0, and by inspection we can take θ = αu/ u , with α ≥ 0, and so
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. First we show that if f satisfies the condition on the derivatives, the same conditions is satisfied by f t , for all t. We have that all the f t have the form h(x) = f ( √ x 2 + a), where a ≥ 0. Hence we have to prove that
, and h ′′ (x) =
x 2 +a , so
where in the inequality we used the hypothesis on the derivatives of f .
We show V t has the stated form by induction from T down to 0. The base case for t = T is immediate. For the induction step, we have V t (θ) = min w max g w, g + V t+1 (θ − g) Defn.
= min
The sufficient condition for (16) follow immediately from Lemma 5.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. First, we need to show the functions f t andf t of (18) are even. Let r be a random variable draw from any symmetric distribution. Then, we have
where we have used the fact that | · | is even and the symmetry of r. We show f t ( θ ) = V t (θ) inductively from t = T down to t = 0. The base case T = t follows from the definition of f t . Then, suppose the result holds for t + 1. We have f ( θ + rG + r τ −1 G)
where the last two lines follow from the definition of f t and f t+1 . The case forf t is similar, using the hypothesis of the Theorem we have
where in the inequality we used Lemma 7, and in the second equality the definition off t . Hence, q t (θ) =f t ( θ ) satisfy (13) withǫ t = 0. Finally, the sufficient conditions come immediately from Lemma 8.
A.5 Analysis of the one-round game: Proofs of Lemmas 5 and 8
In the process of proving these lemmas, we also show the following general lower bound:
Lemma 13. Under the same definitions as in Lemma 5, if d > 1, we have
We now proceed with the proofs. The d = 1 case for Lemma 8 was was proved in McMahan and Abernethy [2013] .
Before proving the other results, we simplify a bit the formulation of the minimax problem. For the other results, the maximization wrt g of a convex function is always attained when g = G.
Moreover, in the case of θ = 0 the other results are true, in fact
